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It was claimed that all quantum string seals are insecure [H. F. Chau, quant-ph/0602099]. How-
ever, here it will be shown that for imperfect quantum string seals, the information obtained by the
measurement proposed in that reference is trivial. Therefore imperfect quantum string seals can be
unconditionally secure.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Mn, 89.70.+c
The idea of quantum seal was first proposed by
Bechmann-Pasquinucci [1], who also found that secure
perfect quantum seal is impossible [2]. Soon it was found
by He [3] that security bounds also exist for imperfect
quantum bit seal. He proposed an explicit cheating strat-
egy with which the reader can decode the sealed message
with exactly the same reliability as that of the honest
measurement, while the cheating can escape from being
detected with a probability which cannot be made ar-
bitrarily small. Shortly after that, Chau studied a less
general model of imperfect quantum bit seal (which is a
special case of He’s model where {g /∈ G0 ∪G1} = ∅ and
α is known to Bob), and proposed a measurement strat-
egy which will cause less detectable disturbance to the
seal if the reader sacrifices the reliability of the message
he decoded [4].
At the same time, an imperfect quantum string seal
scheme was proposed [5]. Though the security of each
single bit in the sealed string is still restricted by the se-
curity bounds of imperfect quantum bit seal [3, 4], the
whole string can be secure in the sense that decoding
much of the bits will result in a non-trivial probability
of being detected. But recently, it was claimed that all
quantum string seals are insecure [6]. The claim was
based on a measurement strategy which is said to be
able to obtain non-trivial information on the sealed mes-
sage, and escape verifier’s detection at least half of the
time. However, it will be proven below that for imper-
fect quantum string seals, the information obtained by
this measurement is trivial. Therefore the security of im-
perfect quantum string seal [5] can not be denied.
According to Ref. [6], the measurement strategy it
proposed can enable Bob to distinguish the sealed mes-
sage with the probability p < pmax. Here pmax is a pa-
rameter determined by the quantum string seal scheme
chosen by Alice. But we must notice an important differ-
ence between imperfect quantum bit seal and string seal.
That is, pmax needs not to have a large value in the lat-
ter. The readability requirement of imperfect quantum
string seal is merely to enable Bob to obtain a string b′,
which matches the original n-bit string b sealed by Al-
ice except with a small error rate ε (i.e. the Hamming
distance between b and b′ is not greater than εn). In
other words, each bit of b′ can be different from the cor-
responding bit of b with the probability ε. Note that this
requirement never implies that the probability for b′ to
be exactly equal to b (i.e. the probability pmax) needs to
be (1 − ε). In fact, even for a very small ε, the number
of possible b′ can be numerous. Meanwhile, the proba-
bility pmax for b
′ = b to occur is extremely small. Taking
the scheme proposed in Ref. [5] for example, the error
rate is ε ≡ sin2(Θ/nα), where Θ (0 < Θ ≪ pi/4) and α
(0 < α < 1/2) are fixed constants. We can see that the
readability of the sealed string can be very high since
(1 − ε) can be made arbitrarily close to 1 by increasing
n. On the other hand, the order of magnitude of pmax is
(1− ε)n ∽ (1−Θ2/n2α)n, which can be made arbitrarily
small as n increases.
So we can see that with the measurement strategy pro-
posed in Ref. [6], the probability p for Bob to distin-
guish faultlessly the original sealed string b is very small.
Therefore the most important parameter characterizing
the amount of information obtained by the measurement
strategy is not the probability p. Instead, it is the relia-
bility of Bob’s output string b′ in the rest (1 − p) cases,
i.e., how much information of b is reflected by b′. Here we
give a brief evaluation with a simple string seal scheme.
Suppose that the sealed state for the message i′ is
∣∣∣ψ˜i′
〉
=
∑
j′
λi′j′ |ψj′〉B . (1)
The expression of the proposed measurement in Ref. [6]
(see Eq. (18) of that reference) can be rewritten as
Mi = (a+ b) |i〉 〈i|+ a
∑
j 6=i
|j〉 〈j| . (2)
Applying this measurement on the sealed state, we have
Mi
∣∣∣ψ˜i′
〉
= (a+ b)λi′i |i〉+ a
∑
j 6=i
λi′j |j〉 . (3)
Thus the probability for the message i′ to be decoded as
i is
pi′i = a
2 + (2ab+ b2)λ2i′i
=
1− ν
N
+ νλ2i′i. (4)
Taking ν = 1/2, as suggested by Ref. [6], it gives
pi′i =
1
2N
+
λ2i′i
2
. (5)
2This equation means that any one of the N possible mes-
sages has at least the probability 1/(2N) to be decoded
as message i, even if its content has nothing to do with
i at all. In other words, whenever Bob obtains a mes-
sage via the measurement strategy, there is a probabil-
ity N · 1/(2N) = 1/2 that the original message can be
anything, i.e., the amount of information he obtained
is zero. Hence we can see that what was obtained in
Ref. [6] is simply a natural the result – Bob obtains use-
ful information only with less than 1/2 chance, therefore
the disturbance on the sealed state is also less than half.
This is consistent with the security proof of the quantum
string seal [5], that reading less bits of the string will
stand less chances to be detected. It does not mean that
unconditionally secure imperfect quantum string seal is
impossible. Instead, it provides a clear example of how
the quantum string seal remains secure against coherent
measurements.
At last, I would like to provide a simple measurement
strategy which is as efficient as the one proposed in Ref.
[6], while no quantum computer is needed. Bob can
simply toss a coin to decide his action. At half of the
cases he performs the honest measurement (which gen-
erally requires individual measurement only) and reads
the string, while at the other half of the cases he does
nothing. Clearly he can obtain the sealed message with
the probability 1/2, while at the other half of the time
the sealed state remains perfectly intact so he will not be
detected.
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